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GUN CONTROL AND AMERICA'S CITIES
INTRODUCTION
America's cities are dangerous places. One has a far greater
chance of being murdered or robbed at gunpoint in a major city in
the United States than in any other high-income nation.'
According to conventional wisdom, this bleak state of affairs is
hopeless. Our high rate of violent crime is due to an American
exceptionalism created by a unique frontier history. A high crime
rate is, therefore, part of the American cultural DNA, and
immutable. Furthermore, it would not matter even if gun control
worked because it is politically impossible. From 1968, when
several of the nation's most prominent Democratic members of
the United States Senate were turned out of office, until the
razor-thin presidential election of 2000 in which Albert Gore lost
several states, including his home state of Tennessee, where gun
rights are especially popular, gun control has made a decisive
difference that cost advocates their political careers. To the
extent that gun control measures are politically feasible, they are
modest measures: trigger locks, background checks, or waiting
periods.2 Thus, we must reconcile ourselves to our condition or be
content with small improvements. That, anyway, is the
conventional wisdom.
I shall argue in this article that the conventional wisdom is
wrong on all counts. Effective gun control is both sociologically
and politically possible. This does not mean that all gun control
is effective. On the contrary, there are no persuasive data that
show that the modest measures advocated by major gun control
organizations and the few politicians who take up their cause
will, in fact, reduce lethal violence. There is a disease, and strong
medicine is available, yet most of what is being sold is placebos.
Gun control advocates have chosen what to push based not on
whether there are good grounds to believe those policies will work
but on calculations of political feasibility. America is not ready to
take the strong medicine so get her used to taking whatever elixir
she will swallow, and then proceed incrementally. Professor
Kristin A. Gross of Duke University recently published a book
' See WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, WORLD REPORT ON VIOLENCE AND
HEALTH 308-13 tbl.A.8 (Etienne G. Krug et al. eds., 2002), available at
http://www.who.int/violence-injury-prevention/violence/world-reportlen/fullen.
pdf.
2 Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 921, 922 (2000 &
Supp. IV 2005) (providing for a waiting period and background check before the
purchase of a handgun).
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arguing that the gun control movement should adopt just this
strategy - an argument that practically falls of its own weight in
light of the fact that this has been the strategy the gun control
movement has followed futilely for thirty years.3
There is, however, good news: the very kind of gun control that
research tells us will be effective is also, over the long-run, the
most politically feasible. Conventional wisdom about the politics
of gun control has been nothing more than a self-fulfilling
prophesy. What is politically feasible this year is not necessarily
what is politically feasible five or ten years hence. Political
attitudes can be changed. The way to get America to accept the
real medicine is not to start her out with false elixirs. That only
destroys faith in the prescribing physician. It is to explain
honestly and forthrightly that real medicine is available, what
that medicine is, and why we have good reasons to believe it will
work. That requires a determined, sustained, and multi-faceted
campaign, and the willingness to persevere without more instant
gratifications from small, but truly Pyrrhic, victories. There are
models that show that such campaigns work. I shall argue that
this strategy can ultimately succeed, allowing gun control to
make America, and especially her cities, safer.
My objective in this article is to provide a crisp description
of what kind of gun control works, how we know it works, and
why it is politically feasible. This article is compact rather than
comprehensive. I seek to provide the reader with an overview of
the most important data and research and a succinct argument
about the politics. Part I of this article will focus on policy. I
shall describe the problem of lethal violence that confronts
America and her cities, and explain how we know this can be
reduced by a certain kind of gun control. I shall propose a specific
gun control regime for America's cities. Part II will turn to
politics. I shall explain why it is far more likely to ultimately
achieve effective gun control by advocating for it directly than
through the incremental approach.
3 KRISTIN A. Goss, DISARMED: THE MISSING MOVEMENT FOR GUN CONTROL IN
AMERICA (2006). To be fair to Professor Goss, she recommends that the gun
movement combine incrementalism with a much stronger emphasis on
grassroots organizing. I shall discuss Professor Goss' arguments in more detail
infra.
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I. POLICY
A. Violence in America: An Overview
We are presently in a time of relatively low violent crime rates.
The murder rate in the United States hit a modern high in 1991
with 24,703 murders, a rate of 9.8 murders per 100,000
inhabitants.' (Throughout this article, rates will be per 100,000
inhabitants unless otherwise mentioned.) During 2006, the last
year for which data are available, there were 17,034 murders in
the U.S., a rate of 5.7.' The overall violent crime rate - which
includes robbery, aggravated assault, and forcible rape, as well as
murder - also hit a high in 1991 and has since made a parallel
reduction.6 Although both violent crime and murder rates have
increased for the past two years, these may represent fluctuations
rather than the beginning of a sustained trend.7 In fact, the
murder rate has remained within a range of 5.5 to 5.7 per
100,000 for each of the past eight years - an enormous
improvement from the period 1990 to 1994 when the murder rate
consistently exceeded 9.0.8
It is a mistake, however, to think of our present crime rate as
low. No other high-income nation has a homicide rate
approaching that of the United States.9 During the mid-1990s,
for example, the United States homicide rate was averaging 8.2."°
During this same period of time, Finland's rate, the second
highest rate among twenty-two high-income nations, was 3.3,
4 F.B.I., CRIME IN THE UNITED STATEs 2006, tbl.1 (2007) [hereinafter CIUS],
available at http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2006/about/index.html. The FBI defines
murder and nonnegligent homicide as "the willful (nonnegligent) killing of one
human being by another." Id. (select "Offense Definitions" hyperlink under
"Resources"). Throughout this article, I use the words murder and homicide
interchangeably, in accordance with this definition.
CIUS, supra note 4, at tbl.1.
6 The violent crime rate was 758.2 in 1991 and 473.5 in 2006. Id. Violent
crime has risen about 2% over the past two years. Id. It is too early to tell
whether this means that the violent crime hit a low in 2004 or whether we are
in a stable period characterized by small fluctuations.
I The murder rate is 5% higher than it was five years ago, but 6.4% lower
than it was ten years ago. CIUS, supra note 4, at tbl.1A.
I Id.
9 See WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, supra note 1. Impoverished countries
have higher homicide rates. Particularly high are Russia (21.6), Albania (21),
Kazakhstan (17.1), and Mexico (15.9) (rates per 100,000 in 1998 or 1999). Id.
10 CIUS, supra note 4, at tbl.1.
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only forty percent of the U.S. rate."1 Canada's rate was less than
twenty percent of the U.S. rate, and the murder rates of France,
Germany, and Israel were each only about twelve percent of that
of the United States.'2 England's murder rate was 0.6, about
seven percent of the U.S rate. 3
Murder and robbery are especially onerous problems for
America's cities. 4 The murder rate for the nation's metropolitan
areas is about double the rates for either small cities or rural
areas. 5  The difference in the robbery rate is even more
pronounced: the small city rate is only 36% of the metropolitan
rate, and the rural rate is nine percent of the metropolitan rate. 6
Among large cities, however, size does not much matter. The
murder and robbery rates are on average the same for large cities
across the spectrum of population sizes, from those with 250,000
inhabitants to those exceeding one million."' The murder rate for
medium-sized cities of between 100,000 and 250,000, however, is
about half that for large cities, the murder rate declines still
further along with size for cities with less than 100,000
inhabitants. 8 Similarly, robbery rates decline with size for cities
with less than 100,000 inhabitants. 9
As criminologists Franklin Zimring and Gordon Hawkins have
so effectively shown, what makes America and her cities different
from other high-income nations is not the rate of crime but the
rate of lethal crime.2' For example, Zimring and Hawkins
compared crime occurring in Los Angeles, California and Sydney,
Australia, both cities with populations of 3.6 million, during
" See DAVID HEMENWAY, PRIVATE GUNS, PUBLIC HEALTH 46 tbl.3.4 (2004)
(displaying data from the World Health Organization).
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 1 use the term metropolitan area to mean one of the 362 "metropolitan
statistical areas" or "MSAs" defined by the U.S. Office of Management and
Budget. See infra at note 152 and accompanying text for a definition and
further description of MSAs.
'5 The rates are 6.2 for MSAs, 3.3 for cities outside MSAs, and 3.1 for non-
metropolitan counties. CIUS, supra note 4, at tbl.2.
16 Id. By contrast, the forcible rape rate for small cities slightly exceeds the
metropolitan rate, and for rural areas it is more than three-quarters of the
metropolitan rate. Id.
'7 See id. at tbl. 16.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, CRIME IS NOT THE PROBLEM:
LETHAL VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 1 (1997).
[Vol. 1
GUN CONTROL AND AMERICA'S CITIES
1992.2" Sydney had 73% as many thefts and 110.5% as many
burglaries as did Los Angeles.22 These data seem to reflect cities
with similar crime patterns. Sydney, however, had only 12.5% as
many robberies and 4.8% as many homicides as Los Angeles.23
Zimring and Hawkins also compared New York City with
London, cities with populations of seven million and 6.6 million
respectively.24 London had 66.5% more thefts and 57% more
burglaries than did New York City during 1990.25 Yet London
had 19.4% as many robberies and 8.9% as many homicides as did
New York.26 By U.S. standards, moreover, New York City and
Los Angeles are not particularly dangerous cities. Detroit's
murder rate is more than double that of Los Angles and nearly
five times as high as that of New York.27
Who is killing whom, and why? We often think about murders
as occurring during the course of another crime - during a
convenience store holdup, street mugging, or burglary, for
example. Yet only about 7% of murders occur during robberies.2"
That is still a considerable number to be sure; in 2006, more than
one thousand people - on average, almost three a day - were
killed during robberies.29 Still, murders during robberies make
up a smaller share of murders than many assume. In fact, only
about 16% of homicides occur during the course of a felony of any
kind.3" The largest percentage of murders, more than 40%, occurs
during arguments." Most murderers, it appears, are killing
21 Id. at 4.
22 Id. at 5 fig.1.1.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 6.
25 Id. at 6 fig.1.2.
26 ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 20, at 6 fig.1.2.
27 CIUS, supra note 4, at tbl.6. It should be noted however that crime has
declined especially dramatically in New York City since 1991. See, e.g., Clifford
Krauss, Crime Lab; Mystery of New York, the Suddenly Safer City, N.Y. TIMES,
July 23, 1995, at § 4 at 1.
28 F.B.I., CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 2006, EXPANDED HOMICIDE DATA tbl.11
(2007) [hereinafter EXPANDED HOMICIDE DATA], http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/
cius2006/offenses/expandedinformation/homicide.html.
29 Id.
30 Id. Murders during narcotic drug crimes represent about 5% of all
murders, making this the second largest category of murders occurring during
the course of felonies. See id.
31 Id. The circumstances in which murders occurred were known in 9,767 of
14,990 total murders. Id. Of those, 3,697 occurred during brawls due to
influence of alcohol or narcotics, arguments over money or property, or other
arguments (the last category being by far the largest). EXPANDED HOMICIDE
DATA, supra note 28, at tbl.11.
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people they know. In 2006, among murders where we know
whether or not there was a relationship between murder and
victim, the murders of family members, friends, and
acquaintances were more than triple those of strangers.32
Franklin E. Zimring and Gordon Hawkins have written: "Most of
the circumstances that generate homicide are not property crimes
involving strangers, but arguments among acquaintances that
nobody would regard as distinctively criminal until the attack
began."33
So far I have focused on fatalities, but fatalities are the tip of
the iceberg. Although guns are far more lethal than other
weapons, nonfatal firearm injuries nonetheless exceed fatal
injuries by a factor of about three to one.34 Hospital emergency
rooms are presently treating about 39,000 Americans annually
for nonfatal gunshot wounds sustained as a result of an assault.35
Some of those injuries render their victims permanently unable to
use limbs or mental faculties, and the cost of all nonfatal firearm
injuries has been estimated at $20 billion per year.36
B. The Handgun-Lethal Violence Connection
America's high rates of murders and robberies, and the special
deadliness of aggravated assault in the United States, result in
significant part from the prevalence of handguns in American
society. If we can reduce the prevalence of handguns, we will
reduce homicide and robbery rates and the number of people
dying as a result of assaults. When I say that strong medicine is
available to reduce violence in America, I therefore am referring
to stringent controls on handguns. Meanwhile, weaker forms of
32 See id. at tbl.9. These are somewhat slippery numbers because we do not
know whether there was a relationship between murder and victim in 45% of all
murders, either because that information was not reported or the murder was
not solved.
33 ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 20, at 78.
34 JOSH SUGARMANN, EVERY HANDGUN IS AIMED AT You: THE CASE FOR
BANNING HANDGUNS 179 (2001) (citing a 1995 study by Joseph L. Annest, et al.).
Other data confirm this ratio. In 1997, for example, a year in which there were
13,300 firearm murders, hospital emergency rooms treated 39,400 people for
gunshot wounds from assaults. MARIANNE W. ZAWITZ & KEVIN J. STROM, BUREAU
OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FIREARM INJURY AND DEATH FROM CRIME, 1993-97, at 1
(2000), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/fidc9397.pdf.
35 See supra note 34.
36 This figure includes the cost of all firearm injuries, including those
sustained as a result of attempted suicide and accidents. SUGARMANN, supra
note 34, at 179 (citing study by Kenneth W. Kizer et al.).
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gun control such as waiting periods or trigger locks, or measures
such as gun buy-back programs or mandated gun safety training,
do not significantly reduce murders and robberies. In fact, some
of those weaker measures make matters worse.37 This section
will back up those claims with data.
We may start with some simple facts: most murders in America
are committed with handguns.38 No other weapon is used nearly
as often. During 2006, handguns were used in 60% of all murders
while long guns (rifles and shotguns) were used only in 7%.39
Knives and cutting instruments were used in 12% of all
homicides, personal weapons such as fists and feet in 5.5%, and
blunt objects including clubs and hammers in 4%.4o This has long
been the pattern." With respect to weaponry, America stands
apart. As Zimring and Hawkins have written: "No large
industrial democracy other than the United States reports
firearms as the cause of a majority of its homicides." 2
Handguns are not used more often in murders than long guns
because there are more handguns.43 Quite the contrary, among
the 192 million guns in America only 35% are handguns." Yet
handguns are used in 88% of all firearm murders.45 Why? One
factor is surely the portability of handguns. It's a handgun that
someone carries when setting out to commit a street mugging or
37 See infra Part C.
38 EXPANDED HOMICIDE DATA, supra note 28, at tbl.7.
39 Id. In 2006, there were 14,990 homicides. Id. The FBI reports that 7,795
of these were committed with handguns (52%), 436 with rifles (3%), 481 with
shotguns (3%), 107 with other guns (0.7%), and 1,358 with "firearms, type not
stated." Id. I calculate that 60% of all homicides were committed with
handguns and 7% with long guns by distributing homicides with firearms of a
type that was not reported among the other categories in proportion to their
shares of homicides where the type of firearm was reported. Thus, among the
8,819 homicides with firearms where the type was reported, 88.4% were
committed with handguns and 10.4% were committed with long guns (rifles and
shotguns combined), and I have assumed the same percentages hold true for
homicides with firearms of a type not reported.
40 Id.
41 See Carl T. Bogus, Pistols, Politics and Products Liability, 59 U. CIN. L.
REV. 1103 (1991) (providing a comprehensive but succinct review of older data);
see also U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES:
2006, at 197 tbl.297 (and at the same table in prior editions) [hereinafter
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF U.S.], available at http://www.census.gov/compendia/
statab/2006/lawenforcementcourts_prisons/law.pdf.
42 ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 20, at 109.
43 SUGARMANN, supra note 34, at 22.
44 Id. Rifles account for 38% and shotguns for 27% of guns in America. Id.
at 22 fig.2-2.
45 See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
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other robbery; it's a handgun that someone may have with them
at an alcohol saturated argument in a bar or friend's house; it's a
handgun that someone may keep in the car glove compartment.
However, because only a fraction of murders occur during the
course of other felonies, portability cannot be the only factor that
explains why handguns are associated with so many more
murders than long guns. Another factor may be that because
people tend to keep handguns for self-defense and long guns for
hunting and recreation, handguns are more frequently kept
loaded and in readily accessible locations than long guns so that
during a brief moment of uncontrollable rage in a lovers' quarrel
or other argument, it's a handgun that one is more likely to use
before anger subsides or the other person flees. There are almost
surely psychological factors at work as well. For reasons not well
understood, it may be easier to point a handgun at someone else
and pull the trigger than it is to do that with a long gun.46
In 2006, firearms were used in 155,770 aggravated assaults in
the United States.47 An aggravated assault is an unlawful attack
on another person that is intended to inflict severe bodily injury."
The United States does not have higher rates of aggravated
assaults than other high-income nations, but aggravated assaults
in America are more lethal because guns are used more often.49
In fact, homicides are often not motivated by the specific intent to
kill but rather by a more ambiguous desire to hurt the other
person badly - a willingness to risk the other person's death
rather than a clear objective to take the other person's life.5"
These murders may, in a sense, be thought of as aggravated
assaults gone bad. A study by Franklin E. Zimring found that
gun attacks are five times as lethal as knife attacks.5' Firearms
41 Perhaps after having watched countless thousands of handgun shootings
dramatized in television and movies, handguns are more psychologically
associated with attacking another person than are long guns. It's simply
something that leaps to mind during a moment of rage. Perhaps because
handguns are smaller and lighter they are also somehow less weighty or
formidable than long guns. Put conversely, maybe because of their size and
heft, using long guns seems like a weightier - i.e., more serious and grave -
undertaking. But for whatever the reason, handguns are used in lethal violence
far more often than long guns.
17 CIUS, supra note 4, at tbl. 15.
41 Id. (select "Offense Definitions" hyperlink under "Resources" to find
definiton for aggravated assault).
49 ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 20, at 51.
50 Id. at 114.
51 Id. (citing earlier study by Zimring).
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were also used in 153,285 robberies in the United States during
2006.52
Robberies are often less premeditated than many assume. Two
men find themselves walking down a dark, deserted street
together. One has a handgun in his pocket. That man did not set
out on that particular night to find someone to rob. He often
packed a gun because he lived in a dangerous neighborhood and
was afraid. Now, however, opportunity presents itself, and that
man robs the other at gunpoint. Maybe he has robbed before and
maybe not. Maybe he thinks of himself as a robber, and maybe
not. In other instances, people are driven by desperation - such
as the addict who is needs a fix or the gambler who must pay a
bookmaker - to acquire money immediately by any means
possible. Maybe they carried a gun to protect themselves when
buying drugs or because they feared their bookie, but at the right
moment they impulsively use the gun for offensive purposes.
Even shootings during the course of a robbery may be impulsive.
Three-quarters of people who have fired guns while committing
felonies say that they did not previously intend to do so. 3 About
half of the people who shoot another while committing another
crime say they fired because a victim resisted or they were
otherwise afraid of the victim. 4
Gun-related robberies actually result in fewer injuries than
strong-arm robberies or those with knives.5 Victims resist less
often when a gun is pointed at them. Nonetheless, robberies at
gun point are more deadly overall because, even though fewer
victims are injured, among those injured far more die. Studies
show that robberies at gun-point result in death three times as
often as those at knife-point and ten times as often as those
involving brute force alone.56
Just how prevalent are handguns in the America, and who
owns them? In 1973, nearly half of households in the United
States contained a firearm of some kind and about one-fifth
contained a handgun. 7  Over the next twenty years, the
percentage of homes with long guns declined from 40% to 32%,
52 CIUS, supra note 4, at tbl.15.
53 HEMENWAY, supra note 11, at 46 (citing J.D. WRIGHT, P.H. Rossi & K.
DALY, UNDER THE GUN: WEAPONS, CRIME, AND VIOLENCE IN AMERICA (1983)).
54 Id. (stating that half of those who fired guns during the course of other
crimes said they did so to defend themselves).
" ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 20, at 114.
56 Id. (citing studies by Zimring and Zuehl, and by Philip J. Cook).
57 HEMENWAY, supra note 11, at 6 (citing studies by several researchers).
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but the percentage of homes with handguns increased from 20%
to 25%.58 However, it appears that over the past decade
ownership of both long guns and handguns has been declining,
and it is estimated that about 16% of adults in the United States
now own a handgun. 9 This decline in handgun ownership may
have been at least roughly parallel to the decline in violent crime
in America - both declines began in the early to mid-1990s and
have continued for about a decade - but I make no claim of cause
and effect. Many theories have been advanced for the decline of
violent crime - from changes in police practices, to increases in
the prison population, to increases in abortion starting a
generation earlier.6" That there is much debate over so many
diverse theories testifies to just how complicated the data are and
how mysterious the crime drop remains.
Handgun violence is a special plague on the African-American
community. Blacks compose only 12% of the United States
population,6 but 39.3% of murder offenders and 49.5% of murder
victims.62 It is, however, a mistake to think of gun violence as a
black problem. Zimring and Hawkins have made two especially
revealing observations about this issue.63 First, they compared
how United States homicide rates would compare to other high-
income nations if all U.S. black offender cases were excluded.'
Although this would cut the U.S. homicide rate nearly in half, the
U.S. rate would still dwarf those of all other high-income
nations.65 It would still remain well over twice the Canadian rate,
nearly seven times the British rate, and eight times the Japanese
rate.66 "So," Zimring and Hawkins write, "the total exclusion of
offenses attributed to blacks would not alter the distinctive
position of the United States as an industrial democracy with
extraordinarily high rates of high-lethality violence."67 Second,
they looked at the black and white rates with respect just to city-
" Id. (citing principally a 2001 study by Tom W. Smith).
59 Id.
60 See, e.g., STEVEN D. LEVITT & STEPHEN J. DUBNER, FREAKONOMICS: A ROGUE
ECONOMIST EXPLORES THE HIDDEN SIDE OF EVERYTHING 117-44 (2005) (presenting
the abortion theory).
61 NEW YORK TIMES 2008 ALMANAC 276 (John W. Wright et al. eds., 2007)
[hereinafter N.Y. TIMES ALMANAC].
62 EXPANDED HOMICIDE DATA, supra note 28, at tbls.3 & 1.
63 ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 20, at 79-86.
1 Id. at 80-81.
65 Id. at 81.
66 Id. at 80 fig.5.3.
67 Id. at 81.
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dwellers in five major U.S. cities, and found that this markedly
reduces the discrepancies between the white and black offender
rates for both robberies and murders.6" They write: "So a major
element in the explanation of the larger concentration of violence
among African-Americans is the fact that they more often reside
in cities where violent crime rates are high generally."69 Not only
are blacks more concentrated in cities but they are
disproportionately concentrated in economically impoverished
areas with failing schools and other problems. It is the
interaction between handguns and socio-economic problems that
is so deadly. Gun violence places an especially heavy burden on
people living in the inner-cities and, as the black victim figure so
clearly illustrates, on black America especially. As painful a
question as it may be, we must nonetheless ask: Would we, as a
nation, be as complacent about gun violence if whites were
suffering from gun violence as much as blacks?7"
C. Does Gun Control Work?
By now it should be clear that handguns are associated with
murder, robbery, and aggravated assault. But if we could wave a
magic wand and make all handguns disappear, would these
violent crimes diminish? Or would the same level of mayhem be
committed with other weapons? Some suggest that the wide
prevalence of guns deters crime because criminals fear potential
victims might be armed; and if that fear subsides criminals will
become more brazen. This argument is promoted with slogan
such as "If guns are outlawed only outlaws will have guns" and
"More Guns, Less Crime."'" So we might ask: If handguns were
68 Id. at 82-83.
69 ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 20, at 83.
70 In the main, whites murder whites and blacks murder blacks. See
EXPANDED HOMICIDE DATA, supra note 28, at tbl.5.
71 The second slogan is also the title of a book by John R. Lott, Jr. JOHN R.
LO'r, JR., MORE GUNS, LESS CRIME: UNDERSTANDING CRIME AND GuN-CONTROL
LAWS (2d ed. 2000). Lott's book sold many copies and his theory was proffered
as justification for concealed carry laws - that is, laws requiring authorities to
issue permits to carry concealed weapons to any citizen without a criminal
record or documented mental illness who requests one - which were eventually
enacted in thirty-four states. Lott's work has been effectively discredited by
serious researchers and will not be discussed in this article. See, e.g.,
HEMENWAY, supra note 11, at 100-04, 247-51 (stating that Lott's "all too often
presents inaccurate information, uses inappropriate data and models, and
obtains questionable results," and defending those statements); SUGARMANN,
supra note 34, at 164-74 (describing the controversy over Lott's work and
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magically removed from American society, would certain crimes -
burglaries, for example - increase? Of course, we have no magic
wand, only the ability to enact legislation and try to enforce it.
There are nearly two hundred million working guns in the United
States, and guns are very durable.72 If we were, therefore, to
drastically restrict ownership of new handguns but allow those
who have previously owned guns to keep them, would it be many
decades before that policy bore fruit? Would so many people
evade gun control laws as to render them ineffective?
We can begin examining these questions with comparative
studies, both domestic and international, that convincingly show
that murder increases with the prevalence of firearms.
The prevalence of guns, and specifically handguns, varies
widely by state and region within the United States. In 1999, for
example, the National Opinion Research Center at the University
of Chicago surveyed gun ownership across the nation.73 The
survey asked respondents whether they had any guns in their
home, car, or garage, and if so, whether any were handguns, and
it provided results for individual states as well as the nine
regions defined by the U.S. Census Bureau.74 The study found
that handguns were present in 14.8% of households in Middle
Atlantic region (New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania) and in
40.0% of those in the East South Central region (Alabama,
Kentucky, Mississippi, Tennessee).7" Or to compare two states:
providing, a convenient synopsis of serious researchers who have found Lott's
work to be flawed). For an exhaustive technical analysis of Lott's work, see
John J. Donohue, The Impact of Concealed-Carry Laws, in EVALUATING GUN
POLICY: EFFECTS ON CRIME AND VIOLENCE 287 (Jens Ludwig & Philip J. Cook
eds., 2003) (concluding that "most states experienced increases in crime from the
passage of the shall-issue laws.").
72 HEMENWAY, supra note 11, at 5.
13 SUGARMANN, supra note 34, at 25 (citing TOM W. SMITH & LuIs MARTOS,
NAT'L OPINION RESEARCH CTR., ATTITUDES TOWARDS AND EXPERIENCES WITH
GUNS: A STATE-LEVEL PERSPECTIVE (1999), available at
http://cloud9.norc.uchicago.edu/dlib/gunst.htm); see also Matthew Miller et al.,
Rates of Household Firearm Ownership and Homicide Across US Regions and
States, 1988-1997, 92 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1988, 1989 (2002), available at
http://www.ajph.org/cgi/reprint/92/12/1988.pdf (finding "a positive and
statistically significant relationship between rates of household gun ownership
and homicide victimization for the entire population, for victims aged 5 to 14
years, and for victims 35 years and older.").
14 SUGARMANN, supra note 34, at 25. The study found that handguns were
present in 24.8% of households in the United States, and that about two-thirds
of those households had both at least one handgun and one long gun. Id. at 25
fig.2-3.
75 Id.
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handguns were present in 10.9% of households in New York and
29.6% in Texas households.76 The wide variance among the fifty
states has provided researchers with opportunities to evaluate
whether the prevalence of guns affects homicides.
These studies have provided persuasive evidence that the
prevalence of guns affects homicide rates. A 2004 study, for
example, found a strong correlation between gun availability and
homicide rates.77 In fact, researchers found that the homicide
rates in high-gun states were triple those of low-gun states.78
Moreover, the researchers found that the results remained
statistically significant even after they controlled for poverty,
unemployment, alcohol consumption, and violent crime other
than homicide.79 That the results remain statistically significant
when controlling for the rates of other violent crimes is
particularly revealing. This shows that the correlation between
guns and homicide does not result merely because residents in
more violent states feel a greater need for self-defense, or that
culture is the driving force, with a more violent culture driving
both violence and gun ownership. Thus, the results convincingly
demonstrate that the prevalence of guns is driving up the
homicide rate rather than vice versa.
Many similar regional, state, county, and cross-sectional
studies have confirmed that the prevalence of guns correlates
with homicides. °  Based upon the data, one economist has
estimated that a 10% increase in handgun ownership increases
the homicide rate by 2%.8"
International comparisons yield similar results. A 1993 study
of fourteen high-income nations for which gun ownership data
were available also found a statistically significant correlation
76 Id.
17 HEMENWAY, supra note 11, at 50 (citing Azrael et al., State and Local
Prevalence of Firearms Ownership: Measurement, Structure, and Trends, 20 J.
QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 43 (2004)).
78 Id.
79 Id. (citing M. Miller et al., Firearm Availability and Unintentional Firearm
Deaths, Suicide, and Homicide Among 5-14 Year Olds, 52 J. TRAUMA 267 (2002);
M. Miller et al., Firearm Availability and Unintentional Firearm Deaths,
Suicide, and Homicide Among Women, 79 J. URB. HEALTH 26 (2002); Miller et
al., Rates of Household Firearm Ownership and Homicide Across US Regions
and States, 1988-1997, supra note 73.
80 See id. at 49-50 (listing various studies).
81 Mark Duggan, More Guns, More Crime, 109 J. POL. ECON. 1086, 1096
(2001).
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between gun ownership and homicide rates.82 Meanwhile, no
negative correlation was found between gun ownership and
homicide by other means.83 Thus, people in nations with fewer
guns were not turning to other weapons. At least two other
international studies have yielded similar results.84
Two famous studies deserve some detailed description. In the
first, popularly known as the "Tale of Two Cities" study, a team of
epidemiologists led by John Henry Sloan compared crime rates
over a seven year period (1980-86) in Seattle, Washington, and
Vancouver, British Columbia.85 They selected these two cities
because, although they are opposite sides of an international
border, they had similar histories, geographies, cultures, and
socio-economic profiles." Both cities had nearly identical
population sizes, unemployment rates, and median household
incomes in adjusted U.S. dollars.87  The percentages of
inhabitants below the poverty line in both cities were also
extremely close.88 Whites composed 79% of Seattle's population
and 76% of Vancouver's.89 In Vancouver, Asians composed nearly
all of the remaining quarter of the population while in Seattle the
balance of the population was split among Blacks, Asians, and
Hispanics.9" Most of the top-ten television shows in one city also
82 Martin Killias, International Correlations Between Gun Ownership and
Rates of Homicide and Suicide, 148 CAN. MED. ASS'N J. 1721, 1723 tbl.1 (1993),
available at http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/picrender.fcgi?artid
= 1485564&blobtype=pdf.
83 Id.
84 See HEMENWAY, supra note 11, at 49, 235-37 (citing D. Hemenway & M.
Miller, Firearm Availability and Homicide Rates Across Twenty-Six High-
Income Countries, 49 J. TRAUMA 985 (2000) and A.W. Hoskin, The Impact of
Firearm Availability on National Homicide Rates: A Cross Sectional and Panel
Analysis (1999) (Ph.D. dissertation)); see also Nicholas Dixon, Why We Should
Ban Handguns in the United States, 12 ST. LouIs U. PUB. L. REV. 243 (1993)
(explaining why there should be restrictions on handguns).
85 John Henry Sloan et al., Handgun Regulations, Crime, Assaults, and
Homicide: A Tale of Two Cities, 319 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1256 (1988) [hereinafter
Sloan et al., Tale of Two Cities]. I have adapted my description of this study, as
well as of Colin Loftin's study of District of Columbia handgun licensing system,
infra at notes 112-27 and accompanying text, from my prior article entitled The
Strong Case for Gun Control, AM. PROSPECT, Summer 1992, at 19.
86 Sloan et al., Tale of Two Cities, supra note 85, at 1256-57.
87 Id. at 1257 tbl.1.
8 Id. (households receiving incomes less than $10,000 in U.S. dollars
annually).
89 Id.
90 Id. The breakdown for non-white ethnic and racial groups for Seattle was
Blacks 9.5%, Asians 7.4%, Hispanics 2.6%, and Native North Americans 1.3%.
Id. Native North Americans composed 1.5% of Vancouver's population. Sloan et
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ranked among the top-ten in the other.9 Seattle and Vancouver,
moreover, are only 140 miles apart, and both are major ports in
the Pacific Northwest.92 They also share a common frontier
history. Both cities were formed as a result of the gold rush and
the completion of the transcontinental railroads in the late
nineteenth century.93
As one might expect from twin cities, the burglary rates in
Seattle and Vancouver were nearly identical.94 The aggravated
assault rate, however, was slightly higher in Seattle.95  On
examining the data more closely, the researchers found "a
striking pattern."6 There were almost identical rates of assaults
with knives, clubs, and fists, but there was a far greater rate of
assault with firearms in Seattle.97 Indeed, the firearm assault
rate was nearly eight times higher than in Vancouver.98
The homicide rate was also markedly different in the two cities.
During the seven years of the study, there were 204 homicides in
Vancouver and 388 in Seattle - an enormous difference for two
cities with nearly identical population sizes.99 Further analysis
led to a startling finding: the entire difference was due to gun-
related homicides.' 0 The murder rates with knives and all other
weapons excluding firearms were nearly identical, but the
murder rates with guns were five times greater in Seattle.'0 '
That alone accounted for Seattle having nearly twice as many
homicides. 102
During the study period, people in Seattle could purchase a
handgun for any reason after a thirty-day waiting period, and
handguns were present in 41% of all households. 3 Vancouver,
on the other hand, required a permit for handgun purchases and
issued them only to applicants with a lawful reason to own a
al., Tale of Two Cities, supra note 85, at 1257 tbl.1.
9' Id. at 1257.
92 Id. at 1256.
9' See N.Y. TIMEs ALMANAC, supra note 61, at 236 (describing the history of
Seattle); PAuL-ERIc DUMONTIER ET AL., WESTERN CANADA 53, 54-55 (4th ed. 2004)
(sketching Vancouver's history).
14 Sloan et al., Tale of Two Cities, supra note 85, at 1257.
91 Id. at 1258.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id.
o00 Sloan et al., Tale of Two Cities, supra note 85, at 1258-59.
'o' Id. at 1259.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 1257, 1258 tbl.2.
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handgun and who, after a careful investigation, were found to
have no criminal record and to be sane." Self-defense was not a
valid reason to own a handgun in Vancouver, and recreational
use was strictly regulated. °5 The penalty for illegal use was
severe: two years imprisonment.0 6 Twelve percent of Vancouver
homes had handguns. 7
The central lesson of this study is that the prevalence of
handguns is a major factor in homicides, aggravated assaults,
and robberies. The study also suggests answers to several other
important questions. Do handguns deter crime? If handguns
deter burglaries, as some argue, the burglary rate in Seattle -
where so many more homes had handguns - should have been
lower than the burglary rate in Vancouver. But it was not. (This
finding has been confirmed by a study that found that both U.S.
states and individual counties with a greater prevalence of guns
also have both more total burglaries and more home invasions,
that is, burglaries when someone is at home.)"0 8 How often are
handguns used for self-defense? The Seattle-Vancouver study
found that less than 4% of the homicides in both cities resulted
from acts of self-defense. 9 And particularly, if handguns are not
available, will people switch to other weapons? The answer must
be no. Otherwise, Seattle and Vancouver would have had similar
total homicide rates, and Vancouver would have had higher rates
of homicide with other weapons.
The second study that deserves detailed description involves
handguns in the District of Columbia."' In 1976, the District of
Columbia enacted a ban on new handguns."' Residents who
lawfully owned firearms had sixty days to register them."2 After
the sixty-day period, newly acquired handguns became illegal."3
"o Id. at 1257; see also Canadian Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46 § 106(4)
(1985).
105 Sloan et al., Tale of Two Cities, supra note 85, at 1257.
106 Canadian Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46 § 86(2)(i).
107 Sloan et al., Tale of Two Cities, supra note 85, at 1258 tbl.2.
108 HEMENWAY, supra note 11, at 82 (citing a 2003 study by Philip J. Cook
and Jens Ludwig).
109 Sloan et al., Tale of Two Cities, supra note 85, at 1259.
"I0 Colin Loftin et al., Effects of Restrictive Licensing of Handguns on
Homicide and Suicide in the District of Columbia, 325 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1615,
1615 (1991).
Ill D.C. CODE § 7-2502.01 (2001); Loftin et al., supra note 110, at 1615.
112 D.C. CODE § 7-2502.06(b).
113 Id. § 7-2 50 2 .02(a)(4). The statute creates an exception for police officers
who have retired from the Metropolitan Police Department to register pistols.
Id.
[Vol. I
GUN CONTROL AND AMERICA'S CITIES
Residents could continue to register rifles and shotguns, provided
they acquired them from licensed dealers and complied with
other regulations."4  A team of researchers led by Colin Loftin
evaluated the effect of the District's ban on new handguns by
comparing gun-related violence in the nine years prior to the
law's enactment with the following nine years."5 They also
compared the experience in the District with that of the
immediately surrounding areas in Maryland and Virginia."6 (The
law was, of course, only in force within the political boundaries of
the District of Columbia, and was not in force in contiguous areas
belonging to the same metropolitan area.)' 17
The results of the study were surprising even to the most
ardent gun control supporters. Within the District, gun-related
homicides fell by more than 25%. ' Meanwhile, there was no
statistically significant change in gun-related homicides in
adjacent areas."9 Here again, data demonstrated that people did
not switch to other weapons: within the District there was no
statistically significant change in homicides with other
weapons. 2 1 Perhaps most surprising was the suddenness of the
change. Any decline in murders and suicides was expected to be
gradual, as the number of weapons in the District slowly
shrank.'2 ' Yet homicides abruptly declined when the law went
into effect. 2 2  The D.C. law, therefore, had a significant and
immediate benefit.
"14 Id. § 7-2502.01(a). Sawed-off shotguns, machine guns, and short-barreled
rifles are banned. Id. § 7-2502.02(1)-(3).
"I Loftin et al., supra note 110, at 1616 tbl.1.
116 Id.
"17 Id. at 1615. Washington, D.C., Baltimore, Maryland, their suburbs, and
some contiguous areas in Maryland, Virginia, and West Virginia are included in
the Washington-Baltimore consolidated metropolitan statistical area (CMSA).
POPULATION CHANGE AND DISTRIBUTION 1990-2000: CENSUS 2000 BRIEF 6 (2001),
available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/c2kbr01-2.pdf. With a total
population of 7.6 million, this is the fourth largest metropolitan area in the
nation. Id. For a map of the Washington-Baltimore CMSA, visit
http://www.census.gov/mso/www/rsf/geo_con/sldOl7.htm.
118 Loftin et al., supra note 110, at 1615. Moreover, gun-related suicides
declined by 23%. Id. In this article, I have focused exclusively on crimes
against others, but data suggest that handgun control also will save many lives
by reducing suicides, particularly among adolescents. See, e.g., Bogus, Pistols,
Politics, and Products Liability, supra note 41, at 1118-20 (and the sources cited
therein); Bogus, The Strong Case for Gun Control, supra note 85, at 23-24.
"9 See Loftin et al., supra note 110, at 1616 tbl.1.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 1619.
122 Id. at 1615.
20081
ALBANY GOVERNMENT LAW REVIEW
The D.C. study demonstrates that gun control can work in the
United States, even gun control that is effective only on a small
political island of only sixty-eight square miles that is surrounded
by more permissive jurisdictions. Washington's gun control law
did not transform the city into a utopia. It has remained a violent
city, and - along with many other large cities - its murder rate
rose sharply in the last few years of the study (1986-88), when the
use of "crack" cocaine was increasing.'23 Yet the fact remains that
for the full nine-year period after the gun control law was
enacted, the mean D.C. murder rate was 25% lower than in the
preceding nine years. 124  The effect of the law was not only
immediate but sustained as well.
125
Collectively, these studies and data convincingly show that
reducing handguns in general circulation reduces murders. Any
form of gun control that accomplishes that will work. For
example, one study found that even a 1990 Maryland law that
banned just one kind of handgun - the short-barreled,
inexpensive handguns known as "Saturday Night Specials" -
appeared to have reduced homicides by 9% without any increase
in homicides with other weapons.'26 The more effective a gun
control system is at reducing handguns in general circulation, the
greater the benefit is likely to be.
There is no evidence that gun control measures that do not
reduce handguns will save lives. For example, for seven years the
flagship proposal of the Brady Campaign, the nation's largest gun
control advocacy group, was a national waiting period for
handgun purchases. 27 This legislation, known as the Brady Bill,
was finally enacted in November of 1993 and went into effect the
123 Id. at 1620.
124 Id. at 1616 tbl.1.
125 As this article goes to press, we are awaiting a decision from the United
States Supreme Court as to whether the D.C. handgun ban violates the Second
Amendment to the Constitution. Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370
(D.C. Cir. 2007) (holding that the D.C. law violates the Second Amendment),
cert. granted sub nom. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 645 (U.S. Nov.
20, 2007) (No. 07-290).
126 HEMENWAY, supra note 11, at 170 (citing Daniel W. Webster et al., Effects
of Maryland's Law Banning "Saturday Night Special" Handguns on Homicides,
155 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 406 (2002)).
127 The organization now known as the Brady Campaign was then called
Handgun Control, Inc., but for simplicity I refer to it as the Brady Campaign
throughout this article. I was a member of the governing board of the Brady
Campaign or its legal action and education arm from 1987 to 1993. Nearly the
entire period of time, the Brady Bill was the organization's main legislative
objective. The Brady Campaign's website is http://www.bradycampaign.org.
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following February.'28 It created a five-business day waiting
period for handgun purchases and required dealers to inform
local police departments of the pending purchase so that they
could perform background checks on the purchasers.'29 In 1998,
the waiting period was eliminated in favor of an instant,
automated background check on all firearm purchases. 3 ° (A
major loophole was that the legislation did not cover sales at gun
shows, and subsequent legislation created a second loophole for
pawn shops.) 3' The Brady Campaign has since touted the
purported effectiveness of the legislation.'32 It points to research
showing that background checks performed pursuant to the law
stopped nearly 600,000 prohibited individuals from completing a
handgun purchase from 1994 to 2000.' There is a strong
tendency to assume that this must have translated into the
saving of at least some lives. But how many of these individuals
subsequently obtained a handgun through some other means - by
having friends or other "straw" purchasers buy the gun for them;
by buying a gun on the black market, a gun show, or pawn shop;
or by stealing a gun?
The Brady Campaign also proclaims: "Handgun Crime Declines
and Lives Are Saved after the Brady Law Takes Effect."'34 As the
careful reader will notice, however, the Brady Campaign is
stating that handgun crimes declined after passage of the Brady
Law, but it is not expressly claiming that the Brady Law was
responsible for that decline. As discussed above, violent crime in
America has been declining since 1991, and thus it has been
declining from the time the Brady Law was enacted until about
two years ago.'35 But has the Brady Law been a factor in that
decline?
The best evidence is that it has not. At the time the Brady Law
went into effect, eighteen states and the District of Columbia
were exempt because they already had waiting periods and
128 Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub L. No. 103-159, 107 Stat.
1536 (1993) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 921 (2000)).
129 Id. § 922(s)(1).
130 Id. § 922(t)(1).
'3' ROBERT J. SPITZER, THE POLITICS OF GUN CONTROL 130 (3d ed. 2004).
132 Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence, The Brady Law: Preventing
Crime and Saving Lives, http://www.bradycampaign.org/facts/issues/
?page=bradylaw (last visited Apr. 23, 2008).
133 SPITZER, supra note 131, at 130.
134 Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence, supra note 132.
135 See HEMENWAY, supra note 11, at 170-71.
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background checks.'36  And after the Brady waiting period
expired, nineteen states - including such populous states as
California, Florida, New Jersey, and New York - continued to
have their own waiting periods.'37 In a 2000 study, researchers
compared the states that previously had waiting periods and
background checks with those that did not.' By looking at the
adult homicide rates in these two separate sets of states,
researchers were able to determine whether the Brady Law had
an impact. Their analysis revealed "no detectable difference in
homicide trends between the 'Brady' (treatment) and 'non-Brady'
(control) states among people 25 and older."'39
Great claims have also been made about Project Exile, a
program in Richmond, Virginia that combined faster prosecutions
and longer prison terms for crimes committed with guns with an
aggressive advertising campaign informing the public of the
program.'4 ° The program was ballyhooed as reducing homicides
by 40%. "' However, a careful study revealed that if the program
had any effect, it was too small to detect.'42 An international
comparison study has also found that major gun laws reduce
homicides while modest regulations do not.'43 Claims have been
made for other measures, such as mandatory firearms training
programs or firearms buy-back programs. Required training
programs may have some small benefit because they add one
more - albeit small - burden that people who wish to acquire
firearms must bear and may reduce the number of people who
choose to do so. The difference, however, is likely to be marginal.
Meanwhile, a number of studies have shown that gun training
courses either provide no benefit or make it more likely that those
136 See Goss, supra note 3, at 177.
7 SPITZER, supra note 131, at 130.
138 Jens Ludwig & Philip J. Cook, Homicide and Suicide Rates Associated
with Implementation of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, 284 JAMA
585, 585-86 (2000).
19 Philip J. Cook & Jens Ludwig, Pragmatic Gun Policy, in EVALUATING GUN
POLICY: EFFECTS ON CRIME AND VIOLENCE, supra note 71, at 1, 21. The
researchers studied only adult mortality trends between Brady and non-Brady
states.
140 Id. at 27.
141 Id.
142 Steven Raphael & Jens Ludwig, Prison Sentence Enhancements: The Case
of Project Exile, in EVALUATING GUN POLICY: EFFECTS ON CRIME AND VIOLENCE,
supra note 71, at 251, 252.
la3 HEMENWAY, supra note 11, at 169-70 (citing a 1994 study by S. Podell and
D. Archer).
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who take such courses will store their guns loaded or unlocked.1"
This is not surprising because the more familiar people are with
an activity, the more confident they become that they can
dispense with safety measures.'45 Studies have also shown that
programs for educating children about the danger of guns -
instructing them, for example, that if they come upon a gun in
their own or a friend's home they should not touch it and
immediately go to tell an adult - are also ineffective.'46 And the
evidence is that gun buy-back programs, where people are paid
for turning guns into the police with no questions asked, have
also been shown to have little if any effect.'47
I am not arguing that handguns are the only cause of violence
in America. Of course, violence results from a complicated
interaction of many factors. Broken homes, alcohol, drugs,
personality disorders, mental illness, poverty, gangs, blighted
neighborhoods - not to mention normal human emotions such as
jealousy, shame, and anger - play roles. But when handguns are
available, problems become more deadly.
Our policy choice is between strong medicine - a regulatory
framework that will severely restrict the number of handguns in
general circulation - or placebos that make advocates, politicians,
and voters believe that they have accomplished something when,
in fact, they have produced no meaningful benefit. Franklin E.
Zimring and Gordon Hawkins have written:
So the choice in handgun control is between two unpalatable
alternatives. Gun control in the twenty-first century will either be
an expensive, unpopular, and untested attempt at bringing the
U.S. handgun policy to the standard of the rest of the developed
world, or it will consist of minor adjustments to current regulations
that will all but guarantee persisting high rates of death. It is
likely that this hard choice will amount to the definitive
144 Id. at 84 (citing multiple studies).
141 Some pilots like to say: The second most dangerous time for a pilot is
after he has flown a thousand hours and he thinks he knows everything. The
most dangerous time is after he's flown ten-thousand hours and he knows he
knows everything.
146 Id. at 84-85 (citing multiple studies).
147 See id. at 217 (stating that buyback programs "have a minimal effect on
street gun violence but could reduce gun accidents, suicides, and the use of
firearms in domestic disputes."). Conversely, buyback programs may make
matters worse because some people may turn in old revolvers and use the money
to upgrade to newer, higher-caliber handguns that hold more rounds of
ammunition.
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referendum on lethal violence in the United States.'48
In the second part of this article, I shall explain why I believe
what Zimring and Hawkins refer to as an "expensive, unpopular,
and untested" campaign for meaningful handgun control is
politically feasible.'49 But before I do, I shall briefly describe the
policy I propose.
D. A Gun Control Proposal
There are only two types of handgun control approaches: (1)
allowing everyone to own a handgun except those who fall into
certain prohibited categories such as minors, convicted felons, the
insane, and others who present identifiable risks; or (2) allowing
no one to own a handgun unless they fall into certain categories
such as law enforcement officers, licensed security guards,
members of the military, and others with special identifiable
needs. The first is called a permissive regulatory system and the
second a restrictive system.5 ° The first system is pretty much
what we have, and it does not work. There are no adequate ways
to identify people who are special risks. It is worth here
repeating Zimring and Hawkins' observation that "[miost of the
circumstances that generate homicide are not property crimes
involving strangers, but arguments among acquaintances that
nobody would regard as distinctively criminal until the attack
began."'' As long as there are emotions such as anger, hatred,
fear, and people who have trouble controlling them, there should
not be handguns within reach. Moreover, even if we could
separate people who can and cannot be trusted with handguns,
handguns would still be present in so many households that they
would be available not only to the trustworthy but to their family
members, friends, and acquaintances as well. There is simply no
way to "keep guns out of the wrong hands."
Only a restrictive method that drastically reduces the number
of handguns in general circulation can be effective. We should
adopt such a system in our cities, where gun violence is especially
acute. Although the experience of the District of Columbia has
taught us that such systems can have some effect on a city-wide
basis, we also know that a gun control scheme is hampered by
148 ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 20, at 201.
149 Id.
150 See, e.g., id. (using this nomenclature).
'"' Id. at 78.
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being so geographically constrained. We know that some people
who live in cities - including people engaged in criminal activities
- travel to gun stores located just outside the city limits, often
with "straw purchasers," that is, friends without criminal records
who agree to purchase guns for their friend who cannot pass a
background check. It makes sense, therefore, to institute such a
system on metropolitan-wide rather than city-wide bases.
I propose instituting a need-based handgun licensing system
within all of the nation's metropolitan areas with more than one
million inhabitants. The metropolitan areas would be the
Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) designated by the U.S.
Office of Management and Budget.152 An MSA is defined as "a
core area containing a substantial population nucleus, together
with adjacent communities having a high degree of economic and
social integration with that core."'53  It includes the county in
which the central city is located plus adjacent counties in which
at least half of the population lives in the urbanized area.54
Outlying counties may also be included depending upon
population density and commuting patterns. Many MSAs cross
state lines. MSAs, therefore, represent the socio-economic
realities of cities, ignoring synthetic political boundaries. There
are presently fifty MSAs with more than one million people: the
largest is the New York-New Jersey-Northern Long Island MSA
with 18.3 million people, and the smallest with more than one
million is the Salt Lake City, Utah MSA 55
These fifty MSAs comprise only a small fraction of the nation's
land mass but include about 58% of the nation's population. 5 6 It
is in these areas that gun violence is especially severe. This
violence is taking a toll on the economies of these areas and of the
nation as a whole, and Congress would have the authority to
impose a gun control system in these areas under the commerce
power. Ironically, such a system has a heritage in America - and
152 See N.Y. TIMES ALMANAC, supra note 61, at 252, for an especially clear and
succinct description of MSAs, together with lists including population size,
racial composition, and population change. Except as otherwise noted, I rely on
this source for information about MSAs.
"I U.S. Census Bureau, About Metropolitan and Micropolitan Statistical
Area, http://www.census.gov/population/www/estimates/aboutmetro.html (last
visited Apr. 17, 2008).
154 Id. (highlighting the difference among states in New England where cities
and towns rather than counties are the geographic units).
15' See N.Y. TIMES ALMANAC, supra note 61.
156 See id.
2008]
ALBANY GOVERNMENT LAW REVIEW
just where we may not expect to find it. We think of the
American gun culture arising from the Wild West, but as Garry
Wills writes of that place and time: "[Tihose entering the towns
had to come disarmed, since it was against the law for anyone but
law enforcement officials to carry a gun."'5 7 Wills observes: "The
West was not settled by the gun but by gun-control laws."'58
A proposal for handgun control in metropolitan areas will be
politically popular within those metropolitan areas without
generating strong political opposition in rural areas. Only 29% of
urban residents own a gun while 56% of rural residents do so.1"
II. POLITICS
A. Conventional Wisdom
In the political realm, carefully nurtured myths become reality.
In 1977, there was a revolution within the National Rifle
Association (NRA), often referred to as the Cincinnati Revolt, in
which political hardliners seized power. 6' This watershed event
turned a principally sporting and shooting association into a
principally political advocacy group and lobby. The NRA is a
powerful lobby, to be sure. Moreover, in the world of politics,
reputation is itself a source of power: politicians are reluctant to
oppose constituencies they perceive as powerful, and thus
perception and reality are very much one and the same.
Organizations, therefore, can benefit from taking credit for
political events, whether or not they actually deserve the credit.
Perhaps no organization has so successfully cultivated its
reputation for power as successfully as the post-Cincinnati Revolt
NRA.'
6 1
The NRA started burnishing its image as a giant killer in 1980,
the year Ronald Reagan was elected President. Reagan, of
157 GARRY WILLS, REAGAN'S AMERICA: INNOCENTS AT HOME 89 (1987).
' Id. at 380.
19 THE GALLUP POLL: PUBLIC OPINION 2005, at 141 (Alec M. Gallup & Frank
Newport eds., 2006) [hereinafter GALLUP POLL 2005].
160 See generally JOSH SUGARMANN, NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION: MONEY,
FIREPOWER & FEAR 45-64 (1992) (providing background information on the
Cincinnati Revolt).
161 Although it is by far the largest gun rights organization, the NRA is not
the only gun rights organization. For simplicity's sake, however, I often use the
NRA to refer both to itself and to the gun rights movement generally.
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course, defeated the hapless Jimmy Carter, whose administration
was plagued by stagflation, long lines at gas stations, a hostage
crisis in Iran, and, as Carter himself described it, a national
"malaise."'62 The public's repudiation of Carter was unequivocal -
he won only 41% of the vote - although its approval of Reagan,
who received just 51% of the popular vote, was less than
rousing."' What was far more stunning was a dramatic shift in
Congress: Republicans gained nearly three dozen seats in the
U.S. House of Representatives and twelve seats in the Senate,
taking control of the higher chamber for the first time since
1 9 2 8 ."
4 Moreover, a number of the most prominent Democratic
members of the Senate were turned out of office.'65
A coalition of New Right groups had drawn up a "hit list" of six
liberal Democratic senators and had launched a coordinated
advertising campaign against them.'66 When four of the targets
lost, the coalition claimed credit. Many believed gun control was
one of the issues that brought these liberal lions to their knees,
and the gun lobby had ever reason to support that view.
Nevertheless, it is not at all clear that gun control made a
significant difference. Frank Church, for example, lost his
election to a popular young congressman by 4,262 votes.'67 The
New Right coalition had subjected Church to a blistering fifteen
months of attack ads, radio, and television.'68 The overarching
theme of this campaign was to paint Church as a liberal,
162 President Jimmy Carter, Televised Address, Crisis of Confidence (July 15,
1979), text available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/carter/
filmmore/ps-crisis.html.
163 MICHAEL SCHALLER, RECKONING WITH REAGAN: AMERICA AND ITS PRESIDENT
IN THE 1980's, at 33 (1992). Third-party candidate John Anderson received 7%.
Id.
161 THEODORE H. WHITE, AMERICA IN SEARCH OF ITSELF: THE MAKING OF THE
PRESIDENT 1956-1980, at 413 (1982).
165 Id.
'66 The six targets were Birch Bayh of Indiana, Frank Church of Idaho,
George McGovern of South Dakota, and John Culver of Iowa, all of whom were
defeated, and Alan Cranston of California and Thomas Eagleton of Missouri,
who won reelection. For a discussion on the "hit lists" of groups such as
National Conservative Political Action Committee (NCPAC), see Chuck Lane,
NCPAC's Waterloo: Taking Sides, HARV. CRIMSON (Sept. 25, 1982), available at
http://www.thecrimson.com/article.aspx?ref=234513.
167 Ronald L. Hatzenbuehler & Bert W. Marley, Why Church Lost: A
Preliminary Analysis of the Church-Symms Election of 1980, 56 PAC. HIST. REV.
99, 110 (1987) (providing the vote margin and explaining why the authors
describe Symms as a "formidable opponent").
168 Helen Dewar, Campaigning Out West, Church Sheds That Eastern Image,
WASH. POST, July 12, 1980, at A2.
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philosophically out-of-step with Idaho, and it attacked him on
many issues including Church's support for deficit spending and
abortion, as well as gun control.169 The ads also sought to
undermine Church's integrity by complaining he voted to raise
Senate salaries, and to appeal to latent anti-Semitism by
accusing him of "pandering to... Zionism."17 ° Church was best
known for his work on foreign affairs, and that was where the
conservative coalition concentrated its attacks. 7' A TV ad
lambasted Church for wanting to cut the defense budget.'72 With
an empty missile silo depicted on the screen, a narrator intoned
that Church "almost always opposed a strong national defense."'73
Ads also accused Church of being "chummy" with Cuba,'74 and
supporting the "giveaway" of the Panama Canal.'75
The gun control attacks against Church were strange. The
Citizens' Committee for the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, an
especially hard-edge gun rights group and an enthusiastic
member of the New Right coalition, participated actively in the
campaign against Church.'76 However, Church was an opponent
of gun control.'77 He earned an "A" rating from the NRA for a
perfect anti-gun control voting record, and had even written a
forward to an anti-gun control book.' A representative of the
gun group claimed that it wanted to defeat Church because
Church's opponent, Representative Steve Symms, who also had
an "A" rating from the NRA was more reliable.'79 "Church votes
the way he does because he'd be tarred and feathered if he
didn't," the gun lobby representative explained. 80 Quite clearly
the gun lobby wanted so much to participate with the New Right
campaign to defeat the targeted liberals that it was willing to
oppose someone like Church who had a perfect voting record on
169 Hatzenbuehler & Marley, supra note 167, at 108.
170 Id. The characterization of attempting to appeal to anti-Semitism is
mine.
171 Id. at 107-08.
172 Id. at 108.
173 Id.
174 Id.
'71 Hatzenbuehler & Marley, supra note 167, at 111.
176 Mark K. Benenson, Frank Church and the Politics of Guns, CHRISTIAN
SCIENCE MONITOR, Apr. 9, 1980, at 23, available at
http://www.csmonitor.com/1980/0409/040938.html.
177 Id.
178 Id.
179 Id.
180 Id.
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the gun issue. Iowa voters probably were not fooled however.
Church had represented Iowa in the Senate for twenty-four years,
and his positions were well known to voters. Church had always
been controversial in Idaho for his liberal foreign policy positions,
and in this election - running against a strong opponent and with
an especially weak presidential candidate at the head of the
Democratic ticket - he simply lost a very close election.
In fact, in their post-election articles analyzing the 1980 Senate
races as a whole, neither Time nor Newsweek attribute any of the
results to gun control."' Said Time: "[Ilt is questionable how
much [the New Right] groups accomplished. For the most part,
the G.O.P. candidates rejected their strident tactics, fearing a
backlash. In general, the Republicans won because their
opponents had grown too liberal for their states."'82 Nonetheless,
the gun lobby began to achieve a reputation of invincibility. Here
is what the famous observer of American politics, Theodore H.
White, wrote two years later:
It was certain that handguns were responsible for most killing
crimes.... The first and most necessary step in crime control was
gun control. But politicians were powerless to enforce that truth.
The gun lobby controlled district after district, where its single-
minded advocates could make or unmake congressmen. Even the
President of the United States, himself nearly killed by a handgun,
would not challenge the gun lobby.'83
As a result, few politicians seeking national office advocated
gun control until the Clinton administration. In November 1993,
the Brady Bill passed the House by a vote of 238-187,84 and the
Senate by 63-36.85 Here is what Bill Clinton says about this
legislation in his autobiography:
Ever since John Hinckley Jr. shot Jim in Hinckley's attempt to
assassinate President Reagan, Jim and Sarah had crusaded for
sensible gun-safety laws. They had worked for seven years to pass
181 The GOP's Senate Surprise, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 17, 1980, at 40; Reagan Gets
a G.O.P. Senate, TIME, Nov. 17, 1980, available at
http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,950490,00.html.
182 Reagan Gets a G.O.P. Senate, supra note 181. Time added presciently:
"Yet the conservative groups may have become a permanent feature of the
political landscape." Id.
183 WHITE, supra note 164, at 360.
184 Final Vote Results for Roll Call 614 (1993), http://clerk.house.
gov/evs/1993/roll614.xml.
185 United States Senate, U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes, 103rd Cong., 1st
Session (1993), http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/rollcalllists/
roll call votecfm.cfm?congress=103&session=l&vote=00394.
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a bill requiring a waiting period for all handgun purchases so that
buyers' backgrounds could be checked for criminal or mental-
health problems.... Most Americans were for the Brady bill, but
once it passed, it was no longer a voting issue with them. By
contrast, the NRA was determined to defeat as many members of
Congress who voted against them as possible.'86
Was the Brady Bill "sensible" legislation? As previously
discussed, it was not sensible from a policy perspective because it
did not save lives.187 Even before it was enacted, few people
expected it have a significant impact on homicide rates. Political
scientist Robert Spitzer has written: "In policy terms, the Brady
law's consequences were expected to be modest."'88 The Brady
Campaign hoped the measure would provide the gun control
movement with a relatively quick victory because the gun lobby
and their allies in Congress would not be able to credibly oppose
it, and it hoped to then be able to build on that victory to achieve
more meaningful gun control legislation.'89 That was not to be. It
took seven years to get this measure enacted. 9 ° The public
overwhelming supported the Brady Bill throughout the seven
year fight. In 1988, for example, the Gallup Poll reported that
91% of Americans favored the bill and only 9% opposed it.'9'
Those are breathtaking numbers; public opinion is almost never
so lopsided on controversial issues. By 1990, 95% of Americans
supported the Brady Bill.'92 The gun lobby, however, was neither
embarrassed at opposing such a modest measure nor intimidated
by public opinion. It opposes all gun control measures - whether
modest or stringent - with its full ferocity. In part this is because
gun rights organizations increase membership and revenue by
whipping up their base with cries of imminent disaster. Every
fight is a last stand at the Alamo. If the measure seems modest,
the gun groups argue that it would establish a principle and
precedent that will lead inevitably to the banning of all guns in
America, enforced by a Gestapo-like police searching every home.
186 BILL CLINTON, My LIFE 557-58 (2004).
187 See supra notes 127-39 and accompanying text.
188 SPITZER, supra note 131, at 129.
189 1 speak from personal experience as someone who served on the Brady
Campaign's governing board during the relevant time period. See supra note
127.
90 See SPITZER, supra note 131, at 126-31 (providing an excellent description
of the congressional battle over the Brady Bill).
"I' George Gallup Jr. & Dr. Frank Newport, Support for Gun Control at All
Time High, GALLUP POLL MONTHLY, Sept. 1990, at 34.
192 Id.
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The gun lobby was able to resist the Brady Bill for seven years
because its small constituency cared intensely about the issue
while the vast majority of Americans who favored the Brady Bill
gave it a much lower priority. As was natural, advocates often
oversold the law's potential during the long political battle over
the bill, and after the law was passed they wanted to be able to
claim that it worked. Echoing some of these claims, President
Clinton wrote in his autobiography that the Brady Law "saved
countless lives."'
93
Later in 1994, Congress also enacted an assault weapon ban as
part of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of
1994.' 9' The ban prohibited domestic manufacturers from
producing nineteen specified models of assault weapons and other
firearms with two or more assault weapon-type features specified
in the legislation. These features included bayonet mount, pistol
grip, flash suppressor, barrel shroud, and telescopic sight. 95 This
portion of the Act was largely cosmetic: what makes a gun
particularly dangerous is not whether it has a pistol grip but
whether it can fire many rounds rapidly. While automatic
weapons have long been banned, semi-automatic firearms can fire
as rapidly as one can flick the trigger, which is more than one
shot per second. The most meaningful part of this legislation was
that it prohibited the production of ammunition magazines
holding more than five rounds. 96 The problem was that the
legislation grandfathered previously manufactured ammunition
clips - some of which hold thirty rounds - and people could
lawfully continue to own, use, and sell them.' 97
President Clinton writes in his autobiography that the "NRA
had already lost the fight to defeat the Brady bill and was
determined to prevail on this one." 98 As he recounts it, shortly
before the final vote House Speaker Tom Foley and Senate
Majority Leader Dick Gephardt "made a last-ditch appeal to me
to remove the assault weapons ban from the bill."' 99 Jack Brooks,
chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, made a similar plea.
'9' CLINTON, supra note 186, at 558.
194 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-
322, § 110101 et seq., 108 Stat. 1796 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 921 to
931 (2000)). See generally SPITZER, supra note 131, at 120-26.
19 18 U.S.C. § 921.
196 Id.
"I See id.
'9' CLINTON, supra note 186, at 610.
'99 Id. at 611.
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Clinton persisted however, and in August 1994 the crime bill,
with the assault weapon ban included, passed the House 235-195
and the Senate 61-38.20o Forty-six Republicans supported the bill
in the House, and six Republicans did so in the Senate.2"'
Just a little over two months later, Republicans made dramatic
gains in the mid-term elections, picking up eight seats in the
Senate and fifty-four in the House." 2 Clinton largely blames this
political watershed on the Brady Bill and the assault weapon ban.
"Foley, Gephardt, and Brooks were right and I was wrong," he
laments.2 3 President Clinton continues:
The victories on the economic plan with its tax increases on high-
income Americans, the Brady bill, and the assault weapon ban
inflamed the Republican base voters and increased their turnout.
The turnout differential alone probably accounted for half of our
losses.... The gun lobby claimed to have defeated nineteen of the
twenty-four members on its hit list. They did at least that much
damage and could rightly claim to have made Gingrich the House
Speaker.... After the election I had to face the fact that the law
enforcement groups and other supporters of responsible gun
legislation, though they represented the majority of Americans,
simply could not protect their friends in Congress from the NRA.
The gun lobby outspent, outorganized, outfought, and
outdemagogued them.0 4
Far more prominent during the mid-term elections was the
"Contract with America," which was signed on the steps of the
Capitol by all Republican members of the House of
Representatives but two, and every non-incumbent Republican
candidate for the House. The signatories promised that if
voters gave Republicans a majority of the House in the mid-term
elections, then on the first day of the new session they would
institute eight specific procedural reforms, and within the first
one hundred days of the session they would bring to the floor ten
specific pieces of legislation.2 6 This brilliant political gimmick
was the brainchild of Newt Gingrich and his allies, and the
legislative proposals were carefully selected and crafted with
assistance from pollster Frank Luntz. Gingrich and Luntz also
200 Id.
201 SPITZER, supra note 131, at 123-24.
202 CLINTON, supra note 186, at 629.
203 Id. at 612.
204 Id. at 629-30.
205 Id. at 621.
206 Id.
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provided Republican candidates with a pamphlet on how to use
poll-tested language to promote themselves and attack their
opponents and the Democratic Party."7
Clinton concedes the Contract was a political success, and that
post-election polls showed Americans knew two things:
Republicans had a plan, and balancing the budget was part of
that plan." 8 Yet he seems to attribute the disastrous mid-term
election results more to gun control than to the Contract. That
seems unlikely. Perhaps it is more convenient for Clinton to
blame the two battles over gun control than to admit that
Gingrich and the Republicans outmaneuvered him in the 1994
elections. Although one of the ten legislative proposals of the
Contract was a so-called "Taking Back our Streets Act"2" 9 that,
among other things, would have made changes to the legislation
in which the assault weapon had been included, the Contract said
nothing whatever about repealing the Brady Bill or the assault
weapon ban, or indeed anything about gun control at all.21° That
is not surprising. All of the Contract's provisions had been
carefully poll-tested, and gun control enjoyed enormous political
support.
Mid-term elections are often referenda on how the President is
doing, and the Clinton administration was not doing well in the
fall of 1994. About six weeks before the mid-term election, Senate
Majority Leader George Mitchell publicly announced that he had
given up working to pass the President's most important
proposal, health-care reform that would have provided medical
insurance for all Americans.2"' This had been the
administration's most important initiative. Although universal
medical insurance would have been difficult to maneuver through
Congress under any circumstances, the President weakened its
prospects by making Hillary head of the project. Giving the
President's wife this responsibility - instead of, for example,
Donna Shalala who, as Secretary of Health and Human Services,
had been confirmed by the Senate to lead the relevant
government department - was unprecedented and
controversial." 2 Such a difficult initiative did not need another
207 Id. at 622.
208 CLINTON, supra note 186, at 622.
209 James D. Polley, IV, Capital Perspective, 29 APR PROSECUTOR 31 (1995).
210 Id.
211 CLINTON, supra note 186, at 620.
212 President Clinton himself writes:
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millstone around its political neck. Hillary then proceeded to
make matters worse by fashioning an incredibly prolix proposal
behind closed doors, without meaningfully including even the
Democratic members of Congress."3 And the President himself
further disrespected Congress - a Democratic Congress - by
holding up a pen during his 1994 State of the Union address and
dramatically stating that he would use it to veto any health-care
reform that Congress passed that did not guarantee health care
for all Americans, thereby not only making him and his wife seem
to be arrogantly declaring it was their way or the highway, but
suggesting that Congress was untrustworthy and was properly
dealt with through threats."4 Clinton had placed Democratic
members of Congress between a rock and hard place: if they gave
him and his wife what they wanted, they looked like pawns; if
they did not, they looked ineffectual. It is small wonder that after
health-care reform expired without Congress ever doing anything
beyond holding committee hearings, many voters thought it was a
good time to experiment with a Republican Congress that
promised to bring ten pieces of legislation to a vote within its first
one hundred days. Moreover, the Republicans took control of not
only both chambers of Congress, they also made enormous gains
in the states, picking up eleven new governorships and most state
legislatures" 5 - races in which the Brady Bill and the assault
weapon ban were irrelevant.
On April 19, 1999, two students armed with a small arsenal of
guns, killed twelve fellow students and teacher and injured
twenty-three others at Columbine High School in Littleton,
Colorado." 6 The incident refocused the nation on the subject of
gun control." 7 Vice President Gore flew to Colorado and delivered
Heading up the effort to reform health care was an unprecedented
thing for a First Lady to do, as was my decision to give Hillary and her
staff offices in the West Wing, where the policy action is, as opposed to
the traditional space in the East Wing, where the social affairs of the
White House are run. Both decisions were controversial; when it
comes to the First Lady's role, it seemed Washington was more
conservative than Arkansas.
Id. at 482.
213 Although President Clinton says that claims that Mrs. Clinton operated
in secret were "exaggerated," he concedes this was the general perception.
"After a great initial appearance on Capitol Hill, Hillary was being criticized for
the closed meetings of her health-care task force." Id. at 499.
214 Clinton himself concedes the veto threat was a mistake. Id. at 577.
215 Id. at 629.
216 Id. at 853.
217 It appears that the nation has since become so inured to school and
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a passionate eulogy for the victims."8 A week after the shootings,
President Clinton asked Congress to enact a package of gun
control measures, the most significant of which would have closed
the gun show and pawn shop loopholes in the Brady Bill." 9 On
May 14, 2000, Vice President Gore dramatically broke a tie in the
Senate by voting in favor of that legislation, but it failed to pass
the House.22 ° In his State of the Union address in January 2000,
President Clinton identified a parent of one of the slain
Columbine students who was sitting with Hillary in the House
gallery, and then he proposed further gun control legislation to
close the gun show loophole and require photo-ID cards and gun-
safety training courses for handgun purchases.22 ' The President
spent much of the first half of March campaigning for that gun
control package.222 He was not running again, but Vice President
Gore was running for president in the fall. Would the
administration have pushed gun control if it thought it had
proven to be politically disastrous? Would it have been
reasonable to expect a member of Congress to vote for it? This too
makes one wonder how much of President Clinton's claim about
gun control being such a decisive issue in 1994 is revisionist
history.
When he sought to wrest the Democratic presidential
nomination away from Vice President Gore during the primary
battles, Senator Bill Bradley of New Jersey attempted to out-do
Gore on gun control by calling for a national firearm registry.223
university shootings that such incidents no longer prompt much national
discussion about gun control. A massacre in April 2007 at Virginia Tech
University, when thirty-two people were killed, failed to stimulate significant
discussion about gun control. I write this shortly after a gunman killed five
students and injured sixteen others at Northern Illinois University on February
14, 2008. See Alan Finder & Sara Rimer, Seeking Campus Security, But Gaps
Likely to Persist, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2008, at A13 (discussing concerns about
campus security following Virginia Tech massacre but not mentioning anything
about gun control); Susan Saulny & Monica Davey, Gunman Slays Five in
Illinois at a University, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2008, at Al (regarding Northern the
Illinois University incident).
2I DREW WESTEN, THE POLITICAL BRAIN: THE ROLE OF EMOTION IN DECIDING
THE FATE OF THE NATION 199 (2007).
219 See CLINTON, supra note 186, at 853 (regarding his legislative proposals
following Columbine); see also SPITZER, supra note 131, at 72-74 (regarding
school shootings during the 1990s) and 141-43 (regarding the political reaction
to Columbine).
220 CLINTON, supra note 186, at 858.
221 Id. at 892, 897.
222 Id. at 895.
223 Michael Crowley, Gun Control Returns to the Fore on Campaign Trail,
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Gore claimed he was just as rigorous on gun control as Bradley
and that he also supported licensing, registration, and safety
training for handguns, but Bradley argued that Gore wanted
these requirements to apply only for new handgun purchases
while he, Bradley, wanted to require them for owners of existing
handguns as well.224 After securing the Democratic nomination,
however, Gore attempted to be as quiet as possible on the subject
of gun control. George W. Bush attacked Gore for flip-flopping,
claiming that Gore had towed the NRA line when he was a
member of Congress during the 1980s. Bush also said Gore had
also been a member of the NRA.225 A bizarre exchange then
followed over a period of days during which Gore demanded that
Bush present evidence to back up his claim that he, Gore, had
been an NRA member, and Bush teased Gore for saying that he
might have "inadvertently" joined the NRA sometime in the
past.226 The point of the attack, of course, was not that Gore was
pro-gun control but that he was a politician with little integrity or
courage - one who would switch sides when politically convenient
and was afraid to forthrightly state whether he changed his mind
on an issue. Moreover, Bush's attack worked to his benefit in
another way. A May 2000 Harris poll found that most Americans
thought Bush was a stronger gun control supporter than Gore.227
Gun zealots were not fooled. But many Americans who favor gun
control but pay no special attention to the issue apparently were
fooled. This may have allowed Bush to benefit from both pro-gun
control and anti-gun control votes.
The conventional wisdom is that gun control ultimately cost
Albert Gore three states - Arkansas, West Virginia, and his home
state of Tennessee - and thus the presidency in the 2000
election.228 The NRA did in fact campaign against Gore, and Gore
did lose those states. But was gun control decisive in those
BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 2, 2000, at All; Pamela J. Podger, Contenders Differ
Widely on Gun Control, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 1, 2000, at A7.
224 David Sarasohn, Anti-Gun Plan May Undercut Bradley, Democrats, SAN
JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Feb. 9, 2000, at 7B.
225 Bill Sammon, Bush Says Gore Had an 'Affinity' for NRA Views; Suggests
Gun Stance Isn't Genuine, WASH. TIMES, May 6, 2000, at Al.
226 Frank Bruni, The 2000 Campaign: The Gun Issue; Gore and Bush Clash
Further on Firearms, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2000, at A8.
227 WESTEN, supra note 218, at 207.
228 Gun Owners of America, for example, includes a statement to that effect
on its website. See Gun Control Fact Sheet (Mar. 2004),
http://www.gunowners.org/fs0404.htm (quoting, at part H of the fact sheet, an
article from the Baltimore Sun to that effect).
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states? Just a few days before the election the Knight Ridder
Newspapers published an article about how gun control might
effect the election.229 The article stated that the "vice president's
support for tighter gun control laws has... greatly complicated
his efforts to win a handful of hotly contested states with large
numbers of hunters and gun owners who deeply mistrust efforts
to tighten the regulation of firearms."230 It said those states were
"primarily, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Michigan, Wisconsin, and West
Virginia.""23  Gore won three of those five states.232 In fact, the
election was regional. Gore carried the Northeast, the Mid-
Atlantic States, the upper Midwest, and the West Coast, with
Bush winning the West, the Plain States, the Border States and
the South.233  The Midwest was split.234  Bush carried the two
Midwestern states - Indiana and Ohio - that are adjacent to the
Border States, and Gore carried the rest of the Midwest.235 If one
looks at a map, one will quickly see that only two states resisted
regional trends: New Mexico and New Hampshire.236 Although
Bush carried Arkansas, he also carried the entire South,
including all seven states that border Arkansas.237 Gore lost his
home state Tennessee; but not only was he fighting regional
trends, he disrespected his home state by not campaigning there
at all, not even to touch down at a Tennessee airport for a brief
speech on the tarmac. The conventional wisdom that gun control
cost Gore three particular states is a post hoc rationalization
happily supported by the gun lobby but lacking real support.
Whether gun control was a net plus for Bush or Gore is an open
question. No one knows for sure. What is quite certain, however,
is that by running away from the issue during the general
election Gore failed to motivate gun control supporters to vote for
him. The gun lobby worked hard to stoke the fires of paranoia
among its constituency. By making them afraid that Gore might
support confiscatory gun control policies, the NRA gave members
229 Chris Mondics, Gore Finds Gun Issue Difficult: Many Hunters, Union
Members Mistrust Efforts to Control Firearms, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, Nov. 3,
2000, at A7.
230 Id.
231 Id.
232 Presidential Election of 2000, Electoral and Popular Vote Summary,
http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0876793.html (last visited Apr. 28, 2008).
233 Id.
234 Id.
235 Id.
236 Id.
237 Id.
20081
ALBANY GOVERNMENT LAW REVIEW
a high incentive to vote for Bush, even if they otherwise would
have preferred Gore. But gun control supporters - who
overwhelmingly outnumber opponents - had little reason to give
the issue a high priority. One demographic very much discussed
during the election was suburban mothers or "soccer moms," for
whom safety is a much higher priority than hunting. Gore failed
to give them, or anyone else who favored gun control, reason to
make that issue a priority in the voting booth.
B. Changing Conventional Wisdom
Whether or not gun control may - today - be a net plus for
candidates who support it, conventional wisdom says that that it
is not. Politicians who like to favor gun control, therefore, are
likely to steer clear of the issue. Or worse, they may try to
support "sensible" or "reasonable" measures - placebos that will
make them and voters feel good but that will not significantly
reduce crime. This has been the history of gun control politics
over the past three decades. It has significantly set back chances
for bringing meaningful gun control to America. The nation is
worse off today than it was before the Clinton administration,
before either the Brady Bill or the assault weapon ban were
enacted. Both of those bills have expired. Attempts to renew
them have failed. And even if they were renewed, they would not
meaningfully reduce violent crime in America.
If the gun control movement is going to succeed, it must change
conventional wisdom. The way to do this is to tell the truth:
strong gun control works; weak gun control does not. Enacting
weak measures will consume enormous political capital, and
result in Pyrrhic victories. The success will not be reinforced in
the public's mind by lower crime. What weak control seems to
teach is that gun control does not work.
Public attitudes are not set in stone. They can be changed. In
fact, they are constantly being affected by events and the public
discussion about those events. Attitudes are undergoing change
all the time, whether they are being shaped by a deliberate effort
or mere happenstance. Gun control proponents have made public
attitude less favorable to their position over the past two decades.
During the seven years that the gun control movement promoted
the Brady Bill as its flagship proposal, it framed the gun control
debate as being between doing nothing or having a waiting period
and background checks for handgun purchases. How issues are
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framed determine how people think about them. Psychologist
Drew Westen writes: "Frames influence not only what people
think and feel about an issue but what they don't think about
it."23 By framing the issue as a debate between weak gun control
and no gun control, the movement made strong gun control
almost literally unthinkable.
Westen goes on to write: "The position of the NRA... is not the
position of most Americans, urban or rural, and it is so powerful
today because no one has offered a sensible counternarrative."239
The powerful counternarrative is the simple truth: gun control
can make a real difference, and it is in fact making a difference in
other high-income nations. That narrative is supported by
evidence. If that narrative seems difficult to sell it is because the
gun control movement has made it difficult to sell. Simply
ignoring it would have done damage enough, but the gun control
movement has done a great deal more to damage its own cause.
By repeatedly trying to sell ineffective measures by calling them
"sensible" or "reasonable" regulations, the gun control movement
has implicitly portrayed effective control as not sensible and
unreasonable.
That damage is significant - and measurable - but not
irreversible. Over the past sixteen years, the Gallup organization
repeatedly has asked Americans whether, in general, they believe
"laws covering the sale of firearms should be made more strict,
less strict, or kept as they are now?"24° When Gallup first asked
that question in 1990, 78% of Americans thought gun control laws
should be more strict and only 2% said less strict.24" ' The
percentage of Americans who believe gun control laws should be
more strict has undergone a reasonably steady decline and today
stands at 56%.242 Meanwhile, for nearly half a century Gallup
repeatedly has asked Americans whether they think "there
should be or should not be a law that would ban the possession of
handguns, except by the police and other authorized persons?" '243
When Gallup first asked this question in 1959, 60% of Americans
favored and 32% opposed a handgun ban.2" Those numbers have
238 WESTEN, supra note 218, at 264.
239 Id. at 208.
240 THE GALLUP POLL: PUBLIC OPINION 2006, at 439 (Alec M. Gallup & Frank
Newport eds.).
241 Id.
242 Id.
243 Id. at 440.
244 Id.
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now nearly reversed. The October 2006 poll found that only 32%
of American favor a handgun ban while 66% oppose such a ban.245
These numbers reflect a substantial loss in public opinion for gun
control generally - a loss for which the gun control movement
itself bears considerable responsibility. This is a self-inflicted
wound, critically weakening public support for the kind of gun
control that works.
The solution is not more of the same. It is a concerted and
sustained campaign to educate Americans that real medicine is
available and what that medicine is. Public opinion will change
along with the frame of the discussion, but it will not change
overnight. The gun control movement needs to muster the will to
persevere. It must resist the seductive appeal of winning any
legislative battle in the next session of Congress. It is not
necessary to drive support for real gun control up to the levels
enjoyed by the Brady Bill. Indeed, it is not desirable to do so.
Paradoxically, the gun control movement should have been
concerned when polls showed that more than 90% of Americans
supported the Brady Bill.246 Numbers that high suggest the
popularity of tapioca: everyone likes it but no one is passionate
about it. In politics, intensity matters. It is not enough that
voters care enough to tell a pollster they favor something. They
must care enough to vote the issue. And some must care enough
tell legislators and candidates how they feel about the issue.
Political scientists call this "salience."247
Drew Westen writes that a narrative that explains why one
should favor or oppose a particular policy is not effective unless it
appeals to 60% of the electorate - and alienates about 30% of the
electorate.248 Unless a narrative makes people who disagree with
your position angry, it lacks the emotional resonance necessary to
motivate people who agree with your position.249 While Westen is
talking about narratives rather than policy proposals - that is,
about a storyline that explains why one should support a proposal
245 Id.
246 David R. Harding Jr., Public Opinion and Gun Control: Appearance and
Transparence in Support and Opposition, in THE CHANGING POLITICS OF GUN
CONTROL 209 (John M. Bruce & Clyde Wilcox eds., 1998).
247 See, e.g., Goss, supra note 3, at 173 (using term).
248 See WESTEN, supra note 218, at 166 (discussing potential narratives for
the Democratic Party and stating that "[albout a third of the electorate won't
turn left under any circumstances, and if the Democrats' story doesn't make
them angry, there's something wrong with it.").
249 Id. at 165-66.
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- what he says is almost certainly applicable to policy proposals
as well.25°
Arguing directly for strong gun control has another advantage.
The gun lobby opposes all gun control proposals, no matter how
modest, because it believes gun control advocates are engaged in
a cynical campaign of incrementalism. It tells its constituents
that "gun grabbers" ultimate goal is the total confiscation of all
guns in America. While the public-at-large does not believe gun
control advocates seek total confiscation, it knows that the gun
control movement is in fact pursing an incrementalist approach.
This allows the public to understand - and forgive - the gun
lobby for its unyielding opposition to all proposals, including
modest measures. The gun lobby is trying not to be dragged out
onto the slippery slope. And, indeed, the American people have
not held the NRA's intransigence against it. The NRA has been
so extreme that it even opposed a ban on Teflon-coated bullets,
the so-called "cop-killer bullets" that are designed to pierce a
police officer's protective vest.25 ' Yet a 2005 Gallup poll found
that 60% of Americans have a favorable view of the NRA.252 It is
not merely gun owners who think well of the NRA, as only 40% of
Americans now own a gun.253 Normally, we would expect the
public-at-large to have a negative impression of so extreme an
organization. By pursuing an incrementalist strategy however,
the gun control movement has made the NRA's extremism seem
sensible. Advocating for strong gun control will not weaken the
zealous opposition of the gun lobby. It will, however, allow the
public-at-large, which does not share the gun lobby's paranoia, to
understand why what is being proposed is, in fact, the genuine
and final objective. And they will have less sympathy for the gun
lobby's fear of a slippery slope.
Political scientist Kristin Goss argues that the gun control
movement must build a grass roots movement, and to do that it
must pursue a strategy of incrementalism 5 4 She believes that
the only way to keep individuals working on the issue is to give
250 Westen and Goss agree that rational arguments are inadequate to change
attitudes and inspire action. It is not enough to describe a public problem and
explain why a particular solution will work. Advocates must present narratives
that will move people emotionally. As Goss puts it, social-movement leaders
"must turn a 'public problem' into a personal threat." Goss, supra note 3, at 107.
25 Id. at 112.
252 GALLUP POLL 2005, supra note 159, at 139.
253 Id. at 140.
254 See generally Goss, supra note 3, at 145-75.
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them goals they can periodically achieve.255 She is, however,
confusing ends and means. It is politically necessary to develop a
body of public support that is not only broad but deep, or as she
herself would put it, that has high salience. A highly motivated
slim majority is more powerful than an overwhelming majority
with low motivation. For some issues, the way to achieve that
goal may be through grassroots organizations built through a
series of incremental campaigns. But that method has not
worked for gun control. What is required is a sustained campaign
to change the frame of the debate, however that campaign is
conducted.256
CONCLUSION
We now know what kind of gun control works and what does
not. Reducing handguns works; reducing them dramatically
makes a dramatic difference. Cities will benefit most from this
regime because they suffer the highest rates of violent crime.
And, understandably, it is in the cities that handgun control is
most politically popular. Therefore, such a regulatory system
makes sense both from the perspective of policy and politics.
Because cities are not sociologically and commercially confined by
synthetic political boundaries, a handgun control system will be
far more effective if implemented on a metropolitan-wide basis. I
propose, therefore, instituting a need-based handgun licensing
system within all metropolitan areas in the United States with a
population of more than one million. There are presently fifty
such metropolitan areas in the country of that size. Smaller
metropolitan areas would be brought within the regulatory
system if and when a decennial census found them to have grown
to more than one million inhabitants.
Such a proposal is politically feasible if gun control advocates
launch a concerted and sustained campaign to explain to the
American public why we know such a system would work. This
will mean that there will be a period of time when no modest gun
control measures are enacted. As a policy matter, that is not a
255 Id. at 185-89.
256 Kristin Goss also believes that incrementalism reduces fear of the slippery
slope. Id. at 188. She writes: "Once people are comfortable with some limited
amount of regulation a little bit more doesn't seem so threatening. . ..
Incrementalist policy approaches reduce the perception of risk and create logical
precedents for further policy making." Id. at 67. But here too she is over-
generalizing. On this issue, just the reverse is true.
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loss because the evidence shows that weak gun control does not
provide meaningful benefits. Politically, it is preferable to be
frank and forthright with the American people, and to educate
them about what we know about what kind of gun control works
and what does not. This period of education will be neither easy
nor brief. But in time it will produce the political prerequisite for
meaningful gun control - a sufficiently motivated majority.
